Lincoln-Douglas Debate
Types of Definitions
by George H. Smith
"I
don't know what you mean by 'glory,' " Alice said
Humpty
Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't &endash;
till I tell you. I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument
for you!' "
"But
'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knockdown argument,'" Alice
objected
"When
I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful
tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean &endash; neither
more nor less."
''The
question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean
so many different things."
"The
question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master
&endash; that's all.""
Lewis
Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
Stipulative
& lexical definitions
Who has
the better of this debate, Alice or Humpty Dumpty? Can the
word "glory" mean "a nice knockdown argument" if that's what
Humpty Dumpty wants it to mean?
By assigning
a new or uncustomary meaning to the word "glory," Humpty Dumpty
uses a kind of definition known to logicians as a stipulative
definition. Humpty Dumpty stipulates what he intends a word
to mean, and that's that. Of course, Humpty Dumpty's definition
of "glory" is not what others understand "glory" to mean &endash;
and this is where his stipulative definition gets into trouble.
We use
language to communicate, and communication requires a common
understanding of the meaning of words. Word-meaning is established
by custom and convention; it is not written in the stars,
for example, that the word "cat" must mean "a small furry
domesticated animal often kept as a pet." But this is the
conventional meaning of "cat" &endash; or, as philosophers
like to say, this is the lexical definition (the dictionary
definition) of "cat" (This is also known as a reportive definition,
because it "reports" the customary meaning of a word.) Thus,
if you wish to be understood, you should not, like Humpty
Dumpty, try to make a word mean whatever you want it to mean.
Precising
definitions
As a debater,
you will often find lexical definitions inadequate for your
purposes. Consider this L-D topic: "Resolved: That the American
criminal justice system ought to place a higher priority on
retribution than on rehabilitation"
One of
the key terms here is "retribution," which the Oxford American
Dictionary defines as "a deserved punishment" But what exactly
is "deserved punishment"? If a thief steals $5,000, should
he, as part of his "deserved punishment," be required to return
the money (perhaps with interest)? If so, then "restitution"
(returning something to its proper owner) will become part
of what you mean by "retribution," even though this is not
explicitly contained in the lexical definition.
We see,
then, that lexical definitions are often too vague for the
debater. When you try to render a lexical definition more
exact, you offer what logicians call a precising definition.
As its
name implies, a precising definition imparts precision to
an otherwise vague definition. Precising definitions are often
necessary in debate. When formulating them, however, you should
follow these guidelines:
First,
a precising definition should define a word that is vague
in its ordinary usage. As we have seen, the lexical definition
of "retribution" ("deserved punishment") is vague, so you
may have good reason to offer a more exact definition.
Second,
you (or your opponent) needs to show why a precising definition
is required for some special purpose. For example, in the
debate on retribution versus rehabilitation, you might point
out that these terms (according to their lexical definitions)
do not exhaust the possibilities &endash; that restitution
has been left out in the cold. Thus, as part of your case
for retribution, you are including the "deserved punishment"
of restitution.
Third,
a precising definition should remain within the boundaries
of normal word usage. You should not, in the name of precision,
drastically alter the meaning of a word. In other words, a
precising definition is not a blank check to saddle a word
with any meaning you wish. This would be a stipulative definition,
not a precising definition.
Fourth,
a precising definition should remove vagueness by fixing fairly
precise limits to the meaning of a word. For example, a lexical
definition of "rehabilitate" is to restore (a person) to a
normal life by training. Obviously, this is quite vague. What
is "a normal life"? What constitutes "training"? (Would torture
qualify as a kind of "training"?) These and similar questions
need to be considered when you formulate a precising definition
for "rehabilitate."
Theoretical
definitions
Theoretical
definitions are those which contain theoretical presuppositions.
In other words, a theoretical definition rests on an underlying
theory, and the rejection of this underlying theory will render
the definition senseless or inappropriate. You will encounter
this kind of definition frequently in value debates.
Consider
the meaning of "retribution" &endash; "deserved punishment."
Clearly, this is a theoretical definition. "Deserved," in
this context, means "morally deserved," so, in order for this
definition to make sense, we must presuppose a theory of moral
obligation. What does it mean to call a punishment "deserved"?
And how do we determine when a punishment is "deserved" and
when it is not? A defender of retribution must be prepared
to answer such questions, or his case may collapse before
his eyes.
The defender
of "rehabilitation" should not rejoice prematurely, for he,
too, is grappling with a theoretical definition. At the very
least, a definition of "rehabilitation" rests on a theory
of human nature.
Do human
beings have free will, and, if so, can a criminal be "rehabilitated"
against his will? If a criminal must cooperate in his own
rehabilitation, then what becomes of criminals who refuse
to cooperate? And what becomes of a criminal justice system
which cannot function without the consent of criminals? The
theoretical issues contained in a definition of "rehabilitation"
are many and complex.
If you
use a theoretical definition unawares, you may find your premises
ambushed by a skilled adversary. Of course, while presenting
your case, you cannot discuss every presupposition of a definition
&endash; that would be too unwieldy and time-consuming. But
you should prepare yourself in advance by thinking through
the theoretical implications of your key definitions.
Loaded
definitions
A loaded
definition does more than describe the meaning of a word.
It "loads" a gratuitous evaluation (such as "good" or "bad")
into a definition and presents this as part of a word's meaning.
Consider these definitions:
A "politician"
is one who is dedicated to noble and selfless public service.
An "anarchist"
is one who professes the wicked and dangerous view that government
should be abolished.
These
are obviously loaded definitions, because they define out
of existence selfish politicians and good anarchists. Philosophers
also call these persuasive definitions, because they attempt
not merely to describe, but to persuade as well. It may be
the case that all politicians are selfless and that all anarchists
are wicked, but these assertions require separate arguments.
They are not legitimate features of the definitions.
Recommended
reading
Nicholas
Rescher, Introduction to Logic, (St. Martin's Press, 1964),
pp. 30-41.
Irving
M. Copi, Introduction to Logic, 3rd ed, (Macmillan, 1968),
pp. 96-103
Francis
H. Parker and Henry B. Veatch, Logic as a Human Instrument,
(Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 80-83.
John Hospers,
An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Ended, (Prentice-Hall,
1967), pp. 18-62.
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